

Thank you for taking time to review our current understanding of the Jeju 2216 accident.

This document is a sample of a ThinkReliability incident analysis report, offering a comprehensive view of the Jeju 2216 incident. Our Root Cause Analysis (RCA) approach goes beyond surface-level insights, helping teams and stakeholders gain a deeper understanding of the causes behind issues. Instead of a traditional narrative, this report leverages visual diagrams with clear annotations to communicate the incident's details in an accessible and engaging format.

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- Deliverables with actionable solutions
- Technical RCA guidance and expertise
- Neutral third-party perspective for multi-departmental or multi-company investigations
- Efficient RCA execution, minimizing time and manpower demands
- Capability to manage complex investigations seamlessly
- Expert facilitation of RCA interviews and meetings
- Support in organizing and presenting RCA findings
- Experience in handling Privileged and Confidential investigations
- Clear communication of RCA outcomes to management

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



**Cause Mapping®
Investigation Template**

Investigate, Document and Present
All in One, 20-Worksheet File

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Introduction to Cause Mapping®- Effective Root Cause Analysis

Explore Cause Mapping RCA with this 45-minute webinar using the Jeju 2216 case study

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Jeju Airlines Flight 2216 Crash

Location of Incident	Muan International Airport, South Korea
Date of Incident	December 29, 2025
Date of Report	January 13, 2025

Cause Mapping®

1. Problem
2. Analysis
3. Solutions

SUMMARY FILE - Contents

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Prepared by: Ben Dellsperger

Incident Description

For a more detailed sequence of events, see Timeline.

Jeju Air Flight 2216 was a scheduled international passenger flight operating between Suvarnabhumi Airport in Bangkok, Thailand, and Muan International Airport in South Korea. On December 29, 2024, the Boeing 737-800 aircraft attempted an emergency landing at Muan International Airport following severe complications, reportedly involving a bird strike and other technical issues.

During the emergency landing, the aircraft overran the runway and collided with an earth berm, leading to a catastrophic crash. Of the 181 occupants onboard, 179 lost their lives, making it one of the deadliest aviation disasters involving a South Korean airliner and the deadliest on South Korean soil.

Problem Outline

Jeju Airlines Flight 2216 Crash		
What	Problem(s)	Plane disintegrated at end of runway
	Date	December 29, 2025
When	Time	~ 9:03 AM
	Different, unique, abnormal	Bird strike, loss of right engine
Where	Facility, site, location	Muan International Airport, South Korea
	Unit, area	Runway 19
	Equipment, tools	Boeing 737-800, HL8088
	Task(s), operation being done	Attempted landing
Impact to Goals <i>Quantify the specific negative consequence to each one below</i>		
Safety		179 fatalities, 2 injured
Environmental		Fire, debris
Customer		Major ?
Production, Schedule		Major ?
Equipment, Property		Complete loss of aircraft
Labor, Time		hrs ?
		\$0
This incident		
Frequency		1x, deadliest aviation accident in 2024, deadliest aviation accident since 2018 (lion air - 189 fatalities)
		Annualized cost
		\$0

Jeju Airlines Flight 2216 Crash

Timeline

Date	Time	Description	Source, Reference, Note
August 19, 2009		First flight of Boeing 737-800 registered to HL 8088 to Ryanair	Plane
2017		Ryanair transferred Boeing 737-800 HL8088 to Jeju Air	Plane
November 27, 2024		Flight spent 62 min on the ground for maintenance, 28 allocated for maintenance	
December 8, 2024		Jeju Air began new flights from Bangkok and Muan, 4x / week	Airport
December 29, 2024	2:11 AM	Jeju air flight 2216 departs from Bangkok, Thailand (BKK) en route to Muan, South Korea (MWX)	Plane
	6:35 AM	Jeju air flight 2216 begins its descend to runway 01 at Muan (MWX)	Plane
December 29, 2024	8:54 AM	Muan airport air traffic control clears the aircraft to land on runway 01	Airport - ATC
	8:57 AM	Air traffic control broadcasts "caution - bird activity" advisory.	Airport - ATC
	8:58 AM	ADS-B data ceased data transmit	Plane
	8:59 AM	Flight 7C-2216 pilot reports bird strike, declares emergency "Mayday Mayday Mayday" and "Bird strike, bird strike, go-around."	Plane
		airplane retracts flaps and landing gear	Plane
		Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) stop recording data	Plane
	9:00 AM	Flight 7C2216 initiates a go-around and requests authorization to land on runway 19, which is by approach from the opposite end of the airport's single runway.	Plane
	9:01 AM	Air traffic control clears the aircraft to land on runway 19. Jeju air flight 2216 performs teardrop turn to land on runway 19	Airport - ATC Plane
	9:02 AM	Flight 7C-2216 touches down on the runway about 1,200m (3940 feet) down on the 2,800m (9184 feet) long runway.	Plane
	9:02:34 AM	Air traffic control alerts "crash bell" at airport fire rescue unit.	Airport - ATC
	9:02:55 AM	Airport fire rescue unit completes deploying fire rescue equipment.	Airport

Jeju Airlines Flight 2216 Crash

Timeline


Date	Time	Description	Source, Reference, Note
	9:03 AM	Flight 7C-2216 crashes into embankment after over-shooting the runway.	Plane
	9:10 AM	The transport ministry receives an accident report from airport authorities.	Emergency Response
	9:23 AM	One male rescued and transported to a temporary medical facility.	Emergency Response
	9:38 AM	Muan airport is closed.	Airport
	9:50 AM	Rescue completed of a second person from inside tail section of the plane.	Emergency Response
December 30, 2024	6:44 AM	Jeju Air flight 7C101 has landing gear failure causing a go around at Seoul	Jeju Airlines
	7:20 AM	Flight lands successfully	Jeju Airlines
December 31, 2024		Data downloaded from the CVR, but a connector is missing, authorities figuring out how to download data	
January 1, 2025		Investigation team from the USA arrives Cockpit voice recorder has been successfully downloaded Government of South Korea states that the flight data recorder will be sent to USA	
January 11, 2025		South Korea's transport ministry stated that both the CVR and FDR stopped working ~4 min before the crash	

Diagrams

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RKJB AD CHART 2 - 22
17 MAR 2016

BIRD CONCENTRATION - MUAN INTERNATIONAL



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AIP AMDT 3/16


Bird concentration chart around Muan International (MWX)



Muan International (MWX) Airport Overview

AIP
Republic of Korea

RKJB AD CHART 2 - 1
30 JUL 2020



Change : Information of MAG VAR and annual rate of change(7° W 2015 → 8° W 2020 and 4° W → 6° W).
OFFICE OF CIVIL AVIATION
AIP AMDT 8/20


Diagrams



Photos




Photos




Jeju Airlines Flight 2216 Crash

Cause Mapping®




Cause Map™ Diagram




Jeju Airlines Flight 2216 Crash



Cause Mapping®



Cause Map™ Diagram





Jeju Airlines Flight 2216 Crash




Cause Map™ Diagram

Jeju Airlines Flight 2216 Crash



Jeju Airlines Flight 2216 Crash



The diagram illustrates the Cause Mapping process. It features a central box labeled 'Effect' with the text 'Building Block' below it. To the right of the 'Effect' box is a box labeled 'Cause'. An arrow points from the 'Cause' box to the 'Effect' box, with the word 'Why?' written above the arrow. The 'Cause' box is divided into two sections: a top section labeled 'Possible Solution:' and a bottom section labeled 'Evidence:'.

This diagram is a complex causal model illustrating the factors contributing to the crash of a Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft. The model is structured as a flowchart, starting from the final outcome on the left and branching out to various contributing factors on the right.

Final Outcome (Left):

- Impact to Safety (179 fatalities)
- Impact to Property (Complete loss of 737-800)

Primary Event (Center-Left):

- Plane broke apart
- Plane slid into earthen berm

Contributing Factors (Right):

- Plane at berm:** Plane location, at berm; Plane skidded off end of runway; Plane unable to stop by end of runway 19.
- Forward Energy:** Plane moving forward, at ~160kts; Plane landed high speed (evidence: V1 with 5% flaps is 132kt, indicated airspeed at 2% is 156kt, no flaps extended, speeds estimated at 160-180 kts).
- Backward Energy:** Total stopping forces; Reverse thrust on #1 engine not working; Reverse thrust on #2 engine engaged.
- Forward velocity:** Plane continued moving forward.
- Landing gear not down:** Landing gear not down; Brakes ineffective; Hydraulic system failure? (evidence: hydraulic system failure to not deploy landing gear would require hydraulic pump from engine #1 and #2 not working, as well as the backup electrical pumps not functioning).
- Reverse thrust on #1 not working:** Reverse thrust on #1 engine not engaged; Airplane lost #1 engine; Bird strike on #1 engine, on approach; Birds in proximity to runway 01; Airport is in wetland area with lots of birds (evidence: MWX airport has specific instructions for pilots that there are birds near runway 01 and 09).
- EMAS System:** Engineered material arrestor system ineffective; No EMAS installed at Muan International Airport; Not required by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); Believed MXW had sufficient runway safety area (RSA)?
- Belly Landing:** Friction force on aircraft; Belly of aircraft and ground; Pilot decided not to deploy landing gear? (See above).
- Berm south of Runway 19:** Provide support for ILS antennas (evidence: ILS antenna's were mounted on top of the berm); Protect public?; Other purposes? (evidence: What is the point of the berm? The berm is very robust and solid (earthen berm with concrete underneath) - this seems overkill for supporting of the ILS antennas. ICAO doesn't provide any guidance for ILS antenna support compared to the USA which specifies they must be frangible).

Other Factors:

- Tail wind on runway 19
- Flaps inoperable? (evidence: videos with the bird strike appear to show the landing gear deployed and flaps down, indicating that at approach on runway 01, the gear and flaps were operable, but were retracted)
- Hydraulic system failure?
- Pilot decided not to deploy flaps?
- Manual release of landing gear not utilized (evidence: in the event of a hydraulic pressure loss, the landing gear can be manually extended using backup system located in cockpit)
- Pilot decided not to deploy landing gear?

Visual Elements:

- Images of the aircraft (Boeing 737 MAX 8) in various states: landing, skidding, and on the runway.
- A photograph of the earthen berm south of Runway 19.
- A video frame showing the aircraft on the runway.

Annotations:


- What was the condition of the aircraft post bird strike, how did the condition of the aircraft contribute to the decision making of the pilot. Why did he retract gear and flaps
- Understanding the design of the airport, and why the berm, the lack of an EMAS and the location of the airport in proximity to high volumes of migratory birds needs to be understood

Jeju Airlines Flight 2216 Crash

Solutions - Action Items, Recommendations

	<i>Recommendation, action, control, idea</i>	<i>Cause to be controlled</i>	<i>Administrative Controls</i>	<i>Engineering Controls</i>				<i>Evidence it was effective</i>
Ref.	Possible Solution	Cause	Changes to Work Process, Task Procedures, Policies, Instructions	Changes to Equipment, Hardware Tools, Software, Technology	Owner(s)	Due Date	Status	Measurement Auditing
1								
2		TO BE DEVELOPED WHEN MORE INFORMATION IS RELEASED						
3								

Evaluate the Different Possible Solutions



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RKJB AD CHART 2 - 5
30 JUL 2020




AERODROME ELEV 51 ft
HEIGHTS RELATED TO
THR RWY 01 ELEV 32 ft

GWANGJU APP	120.475	130.0
	228.9	265.5
MUAN TWR	118.25	118.85

MUAN/Muan Intl(RKJB)
ILS or LOC Y RWY 01


Note : Approach under ICAO Flight Procedure



RECOMMENDED PROFILE(LOC ONLY)	DME IMUN	5	4	3	2
Final Approach Gradient 5.31%, 323 ft/NM	ALT(HGT)	1 645	1 322	999	660
		1 613	1 290	(967)	(628)

MISSED APPROACH

Climb on R 007 MUN/D4, then turn left
HDG 298° to GOBUN and Hold at 5 000 ft



CATEGORY			D4/DH/6 M24/M14/DH/1	A	B	C	D							
STA	CAT-I	FULL	232	RVR 550 m, VIS 800 m				Rate of descent	Knots	60	90	120	150	180
		ALS INOP	(200)	1 200 m					V/V fpm	318	478	637	796	955
	LOC	FULL	660	2 600 m				* Timing Not authorized for defining MAPt. * Circling Not authorized.						
		ALS INOP	(628)	3 300 m										

Change : Amended ILS plan view symbol.

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
AIP AMDT 13/19

AERODROME ELEV 51 ft
HEIGHTS RELATED TO
THR RWY 18 - ELEV 51 ft

GWANGJU APP	120.475	130.0
	228.9	265.5
MUAN TWR	118.25	118.85

MUAN/Muan Intl(RKJB)
ILS or LOC Y RWY 19

Note : Approach under ICAO Flight Procedure




RECOMMENDED PROFILE(LOC ONLY)	DME IMAN	5	4	3	2	1.7
Final Approach Gradient 5.31%, 323 ft/NM	ALT(HGT)	1 660 (1 609)	1 338 (1 287)	1 015 (964)	692 (641)	590 (539)

MISSED APPROACH

Climb on R 187 MUN/D0.5, then turn right
HDG 016° to GOBUN and Hold at 5 000 ft

TRANSITION ALT 14 000



CATEGORY				DA/HS/ MO/AN/MS/HS	A	B	C	D							
STA	CAT-1 (CG 2.5%)	FULL	414 (363)		1 200 m										
		ALS INOP			1 900 m										
	CAT-4 (CG 5.0%)	FULL	251 (200)		RVR 550 m, VIS 800 m										
		ALS INOP			1 200 m										
		FULL	590 (539)		2 000 m										
	LOC				2 700 m										
		ALS INOP													
									Rate of descent	V/V fpm	60	90	120	150	180
										318	478	637	796	955	
* Timing Not authorized for defining MAPt.															
* Circling Not authorized.															

Change : Amended ILS plan view symbol.


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AIP AMDT 13/19


Muan International (MWX) ILS Approach Runway 01

Muan International (MWX) ILS Approach Runway 19

Diagrams




Boeing 737-800 Electrical System



* For reference only, not to be used for flight

Boeing 737-800 Hydraulic System



TOTAL HYDRAULIC QUANTITY	
A-SYSTEM	B AND STANDBY SYSTEM
13 USG	20 USG
approx. 49 lt	approx. 76 lt

ENGINE FIRE
or
Engine Severe Damage or Separation

Condition: One or more of these occur:

- Engine fire warning
- Airframe vibrations with abnormal engine indications
- Engine separation.

1 Autothrottle (if engaged)Disengage

2 Thrust lever (affected engine)ConfirmClose

3 Engine start lever (affected engine)Confirm . . . CUTOFF

4 Engine fire switch (affected engine)Confirm Pull
To manually unlock the engine fire switch, press the override and pull.

5 If the engine fire switch or ENG OVERHEAT light stays illuminated:
Engine fire switch Rotate to the stop and hold for 1 second
If after 30 seconds the engine fire switch or ENG OVERHEAT light stays illuminated:
Engine fire switch. Rotate to the other stop and hold for 1 second

6 If high airframe vibration occurs and continues after the engine is shut down:
Without delay, reduce airspeed and descend to a safe altitude which results in an acceptable vibration level.
If high vibration returns and further airspeed reduction and descent are not practicable, increasing airspeed may reduce vibration.

7 ISOLATION VALVE switch. CLOSE

Continued on next page

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D6-27370-804-BRI(P2)July 17, 2009

ENGINE FIRE or Engine Severe Damage or Separation continued

8 PACK switch (affected side) OFF
This causes the operating pack to regulate to high flow in flight with the flaps up.

9 APU BLEED air switch OFF

10 Choose one:
APU is available for start:
APU START
When APU is running:
APU GEN switch (affected side)ON
Go to step 11
APU is not available:
Go to step 11

11 Balance fuel as needed.
G-FDZA - G-FDZS

12 Transponder mode selector TA
This prevents climb commands which can exceed single engine performance capability.

G-CDZH - G-CDZM

13 Transponder mode selector TA ONLY
This prevents climb commands which can exceed single engine performance capability.

14 If wing anti-ice is needed:
ISOLATION VALVE switch (after fire has been extinguished) AUTO

15 Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport.
G-CDZH - G-CDZM, G-FDZJ
Go to the One Engine Inoperative Landing <> checklist on page 7.18
G-FDZA - G-FDZG, G-FDZR, G-FDZS
Go to the One Engine Inoperative Landing <> checklist on page 7.20

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One Engine Inoperative Landing <>

G-CDZH - G-CDZM, G-FDZJ

Condition: Landing must be made with one engine inoperative.

1 Plan a flaps 15 landing.

2 Set VREF 15 or VREF ICE.
If any of the following conditions apply, set VREF ICE = VREF 15 + 10 knots:
Engine anti-ice will be used during landing
Wing anti-ice has been used any time during the flight
Icing conditions were encountered during the flight and the landing temperature is below 10° C.
Note: When VREF ICE is needed, the wind additive should not exceed 10 knots.

3 Maintain VREF 15 + 5 knots or VREF ICE + 5 knots minimum on final approach to assure sufficient maneuver margin and speed for go-around.

4 Use engine anti-ice on the operating engine only.

5 Checklist Complete Except Deferred Items

Deferred Items

Descent Checklist

Pressurization LAND ALT
Recall Checked
Autobrake
Landing data VREF 15 or VREF ICE, Minimums
Approach briefing Completed

If additional go-around thrust is needed:
Configure the pressurization system for a no engine bleed landing when below 10,000 feet.
WING ANTI-ICE switch OFF

Continued on next page

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One Engine Inoperative Landing <> continued

ISOLATION VALVE switch CLOSE
BLEED 1 air switch OFF
Do not open the APU bleed air valve if the engine fire switch is illuminated.
APU BLEED air switch ON
Left PACK switch AUTO
BLEED 2 air switch OFF

Go-around Procedure Review

Do the normal go-around procedure except:
Use flaps 1.
Maintain VREF 15 + 5 knots or VREF ICE + 5 knots until reaching flap retraction altitude.
Limit bank angle to 15° when airspeed is less than VREF 15 + 15 knots or VREF ICE + 5 knots or the minimum maneuver speed, whichever is lower.
Accelerate to flaps 1 maneuvering speed before flap retraction.

Approach Checklist

Altimeters QNH
NAV aidsSet

Additional Deferred Item

GROUND PROXIMITY FLAP
INHIBIT switch FLAP INHIBIT

Landing Checklist

Cabin Secure
ENGINE START switch (operating engine) CONT
Speedbrake ARMED
Landing gear Down

Continued on next page

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One Engine Inoperative Landing <>		
G-CDZH - G-CDZM, G-FDZJ		
Condition: Landing must be made with one engine inoperative.		
1 Plan a flaps 15 landing.		
2 Set VREF 15 or VREF ICE.		
If any of the following conditions apply, set VREF ICE = VREF 15 + 10 knots: Engine anti-ice will be used during landing Wing anti-ice has been used any time during the flight Icing conditions were encountered during the flight and the landing temperature is below 10° C.		
3 Maintain VREF 15 + 5 knots or VREF ICE + 5 knots minimum on final approach to assure sufficient maneuver margin and speed for go-around.		
4 Use engine anti-ice on the operating engine only.		
5 Checklist Complete Except Deferred Items		
Deferred Items		
Descent Checklist		
Pressurization	LAND ALT ____	
Recall	Checked	
Autobrake		
Landing data	VREF 15 or VREF ICE, Minimums	
Approach briefing	Completed	
If additional go-around thrust is needed: Configure the pressurization system for a no engine bleed landing when below 10,000 feet.		
WING ANTI-ICE switch OFF		
Continued on next page		
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One Engine Inoperative Landing <> continued		
Choose one:		
Landing using flaps 30: Use flaps 15. Maintain VREF 30 + 5 knots and limit bank angle to 15° until initial maneuvering is complete and a safe altitude is reached. Go to Approach Checklist below		
Landing using flaps 15: Use flaps 1. Maintain VREF 15 + 5 knots or VREF ICE + 5 knots until reaching flap retraction altitude. Limit bank angle to 15° when airspeed is less than VREF 15 + 15 knots or VREF ICE + 5 knots or the minimum maneuver speed, whichever is lower. Accelerate to flaps 1 maneuvering speed before flap retraction. Go to Approach Checklist below		
Approach Checklist		
Altimeters	QNH ____	
NAV aids	Set	
Additional Deferred Item		
Choose one:		
Landing using flaps 30: Go to Landing Checklist below		
Landing using flaps 15: GROUND PROXIMITY FLAP INHIBIT switch FLAP INHIBIT Go to Landing Checklist below		
Continued on next page		
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One Engine Inoperative Landing <> continued		
ISOLATION VALVE switch CLOSE		
BLEED 1 air switch OFF		
Do not open the APU bleed air valve if the engine fire switch is illuminated.		
APU BLEED air switch ON		
Left PACK switch AUTO		
BLEED 2 air switch OFF		
Go-around Procedure Review		
Do the normal go-around procedure except: Use flaps 1. Maintain VREF 15 + 5 knots or VREF ICE + 5 knots until reaching flap retraction altitude. Limit bank angle to 15° when airspeed is less than VREF 15 + 15 knots or VREF ICE + 5 knots or the minimum maneuver speed, whichever is lower. Accelerate to flaps 1 maneuvering speed before flap retraction.		
Approach Checklist		
Altimeters	QNH ____	
NAV aids	Set	
Additional Deferred Item		
GROUND PROXIMITY FLAP INHIBIT switch FLAP INHIBIT		
Landing Checklist		
Cabin Secure		
ENGINE START switch (operating engine) CONT		
Speedbrake ARMED		
Landing gear Down		
Continued on next page		
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One Engine Inoperative Landing <> continued		
Landing Checklist		
Cabin Secure		
ENGINE START switch (operating engine) CONT		
Speedbrake ARMED		
Landing gear Down		
Flaps Green light		
REVERSER		
Condition: A fault occurs in the thrust reverser system.		
Note: Additional system failures may cause in-flight deployment.		
1 Expect normal reverser operation after landing.		
Continued on next page		
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One Engine Inoperative Landing <> continued		
Flaps 15, Green light		
One Engine Inoperative Landing <>		
G-FDZA - G-FDZG, G-FDZR, G-FDZS		
Condition: Landing must be made with one engine inoperative.		
1 Choose one:		
Landing using flaps 30 (if performance allows): Use flaps 30 and VREF 30 for landing and flaps 15 for go-around. Go to step 4		
Landing using flaps 15: Go to step 2		
Note: Company policy is that all One Engine Inoperative Landings should be made using flaps 15.		
2 Use flaps 15 and VREF 15 or VREF ICE for landing and flaps 1 for go-around.		
If any of the following conditions apply, set VREF ICE = VREF 15 + 10 knots: Engine anti-ice will be used during landing Wing anti-ice has been used any time during the flight Icing conditions were encountered during the flight and the landing temperature is below 10° C.		
Note: When VREF ICE is needed, the wind additive should not exceed 10 knots.		
3 Maintain VREF 15 + 5 knots or VREF ICE + 5 knots minimum on final approach to assure sufficient maneuver margin and speed for go-around.		
Note: Autoland operations are not authorized when landing with flaps 15.		
Continued on next page		
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One Engine Inoperative Landing <> continued		
4 Use engine anti-ice on the operating engine only.		
5 Checklist Complete Except Deferred Items		
Deferred Items		
Descent Checklist		
Pressurization	LAND ALT ____	
Recall	Checked	
Autobrake		
Landing data	VREF as directed by checklist, Minimums	
Approach briefing	Completed	
Note: Check authorized autoland weather minima.		
If additional go-around thrust is needed: Configure the pressurization system for a no engine bleed landing when below 10,000 feet.		
WING ANTI-ICE switch OFF		
ISOLATION VALVE switch CLOSE		
BLEED 1 air switch OFF		
Do not open the APU bleed air valve if the engine fire switch is illuminated.		
APU BLEED air switch ON		
Left PACK switch AUTO		
BLEED 2 air switch OFF		
Go-around Procedure Review		
Do the normal go-around procedure except:		
Continued on next page		
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Resources

Title	Source	Format	Note	Link
Jeju Air plane flew relentlessly before tragedy with minimal maintenance	The Korea Times	Website		https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/12/281_389392.html
Jeju Air - Flight 2216	Wikipedia			https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeju_Air_Flight_2216
Crash: Jeju B738 at Muan	Aviation Herald			https://avherald.com/h?article=52225189&opt=512
Jeju Airlines Crash	Swiss 001	YouTube		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eyJHqp6V68Q
	Reuters	Website		https://www.reuters.com/graphics/SOUTHKOREA-CRASH/MAPS/movawoejova/
Southwest bird strike - New Orleans		YouTube		https://youtu.be/JrFeBr6QRsY?si=1Mp_7pijAzofw_mY