In the early morning hours of January 1, 2025, a terrorist drove a pickup truck into a crowd of New Year’s Eve revelers on Bourbon Street, killing 15 individuals and injuring at least 57 others. In the immediate aftermath, anger and grief turned into public outcry, with many pointing fingers at the city of New Orleans and the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) for not doing more to ensure safety.
The impulse to assign blame after a tragedy is natural. People want answers and accountability, especially when the loss feels preventable. But focusing on blame alone can obscure opportunities to learn. To prevent similar incidents in the future, we need to objectively analyze what happened. With this in mind, let’s take a closer look at the events of that tragic day.
On that fateful day, a terrorist driving a Ford pickup truck turned onto Canal Street, heading toward the Bourbon Street intersection. Although the Bourbon Street entrance to the French Quarter area was closed to vehicular traffic and barricaded with an NOPD cruiser, the attacker bypassed the police car by driving onto the sidewalk. From there, the truck entered Bourbon Street, hitting multiple pedestrians.
This tragedy unfolded despite years of security enhancements in the French Quarter. After the 2016 truck attack in Nice, France1, New Orleans prioritized pedestrian safety by installing permanent bollards2 and deploying portable Archer barriers3 during large events. Over time, the bollards got clogged up with Mardi Gras beads and stopped working reliably. A 2019 security assessment recommended repairs, and by late 2024, the city had started replacing outdated bollards4. The bollards at the intersection of Bourbon and Canal were removed as part of this project.
For the 2024 New Year’s Eve celebration, temporary measures were used in place of the bollards. Plastic barricades, fencing, and police vehicles were deployed, but hydraulic roadblocks5 and portable Archer barriers3—previously used for high-profile events—were not deployed. Notably, a Department of Homeland Security bulletin issued just weeks earlier warned law enforcement about the increased risk of vehicle-ramming attacks6.
This overview of the incident allows us to begin our analysis with a 5-Why Cause Map™ diagram.
New Orleans Truck Attack 5-Why Cause Map™
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The 5-Why above provides a starting point for discussing the causes of this incident. While it’s accurate, it highlights a common criticism of the 5-Whys approach: its tendency to reinforce a blame perspective. Linear 5-Whys can be built to reinforce a specific point of view, often confirming the biases of the person constructing the analysis. In this case, it’s easy to see why many members of the public are blaming NOPD, because the police car was ineffective as a barricade. Why? Because the truck was able to route around it.
While true, this explanation is partial. A more thorough analysis will dig deeper into why the barricade was ineffective. The causes are there if we choose to reveal them, making this initial 5-Why a useful but partial foundation for a more comprehensive explanation of what happened.
In incidents like this, understanding the relative positions of key factors—the terrorist, the barricade, and the area being protected—is critical. That’s where diagrams come into play. The diagram below provides a clearer view of the intersection layout. The dotted line shows the approximate path the truck took as it drove onto the sidewalk around the police car, then through a wedge barrier that was not raised (i.e., activated). The diagram also highlights the location of bollards that were recently removed as well as awning poles along Bourbon Street.
Terrorist Route Diagram (Developed by ThinkReliability – Photos are from Google Earth)
Click on image to expand
This different view of the incident helps to reveal additional causes that contributed to the incident. The truck’s ability to access Bourbon Street demonstrates one of the physical Fundamental Relationships of cause-and-effect that we teach in our workshop. This is the concept of a transfer, also called a leak, loss of containment, or—as is most appropriate in this instance—a breach. For a breach to occur, there must be a path, a medium or material, and a force.
Transfer Fundamental Relationship
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In this incident, the path was the distance (width) between adjacent barriers and the medium/material was the size (width) of the truck. The truck was able to pass through because the gap between barriers was wider than the truck’s width. Alongside these two factors, the only other requirement to create a breach is a force, which in this case an individual with malicious intentions. All three causes were required for the truck to be able to breach the barricade.
Applying fundamental relationships provides structure to the analysis and helps organize the many causes that contributed to the incident. For instance, the cause of the sufficient opening that allowed the truck to breach the barricade can be broken down further. Factors to consider include:
New Orleans Truck Attack Transfer/Breach Relationship
Notice the multiple AND relationships in the diagram above. When two or more causes are required to produce the effect (shown with an AND in between parallel causes on a Cause Map diagram), you only need to change one to change the outcome—and therefore reduce the risk of similar incidents in the future. For example, we could change the number of barricades, adding more to cover the sidewalk access points. Or we could shorten the total length of the barricade area by positioning the police car deeper onto Bourbon Street, where we could better leverage nearby buildings and awning poles as natural barriers.
When two or more causes are required to produce the outcome, changing just one is enough to change the outcome and reduce the risk. But you don’t have to stop there. Implementing multiple changes creates layers of protection, where independent solutions work together to further reduce the likelihood of similar incidents in the future.
In the aftermath of the attack, much of the public discussion centered on the removed permanent bollards7 and lack of Archer barriers8 at the Bourbon and Canal intersection. The NOPD officials emphasized that even if the bollards and Archer barriers had been in place, the attacker might still have been able to bypass them. “We did have a car there, we had barriers there, we had officers there, and they still got around,” said NOPD Superintendent Anne Kirkpatrick9. “We did indeed have a plan, but the terrorist defeated it.”
This statement is accurate—but it doesn’t mean future incidents are unpreventable. To make meaningful progress, solutions need to be specific and detailed. For example, increasing the number of barriers and reducing the gap between them could mitigate similar risks in future events. Additionally, the temporary measures in place during the New Year’s Eve celebration highlight the importance of contingency planning during construction projects. If bollards are removed, alternative solutions—such as portable Archer barriers or wedge barriers—must be fully operational and there must be a process for implementing them.
By analyzing incidents like this one in detail, organizations can identify multiple causes and implement a range of solutions that work together to reduce risk effectively. For further analysis of this incident, check out our New Orleans Truck Attack Cause Mapping® Report.
Click on image to view the full intermediate investigation report
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1 - 2016 truck attack in Nice, France
2 - Permanent bollards
3 - Portable Archer barriers
4 - Replacing outdated bollards
5 - Hydraulic roadblocks
6 - Risk of vehicle-ramming attacks
7 - Removed permanent bollards
8 - Lack of Archer barriers
9 - NOPD Superintendent Anne Kirkpatrick